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BOOK REVIEWS

MEDICAL ETHICS:
The Moral Responsibilities oj Physicians
by Tom L. Beauchamp and Laurence B. McCullough
New York: Prent ice-Hall, 1984. 172 pp., paper. $ 13.95.
This book attempts to analyze many contemporary problems in medical eth ics according
to the norm s estab li shed by the principles of beneficence and autonomy. The a uthors
contend that neither beneficence nor autonomy is sufficient to determine the ethically
correct courses of action in va rious insta nces , and they a rgue in behalf of the dominance of
the principle of beneficence limited by the principle of autonomy . Autonomy and
beneficence are primafacie principl es which can be overridden by other moral principles.
but ordinarily cons id erations of utilit y or good consequences justify overriding these
principles. They argue that the principle of beneficence mu st be weighed against variou s
goods and harm s caused by medical intervent ions , and this reduces to a uti litarian or
co nsequentiali st reduction of the moral principles. The fundamental problem with this
book is that the notions of benefice nce and autonomy are mad e to carry too much freight,
and more principles are needed.
The authors admit that the autonomy-based model has crept into American medicine
since 1972 and they appear to be uncomfortable with this development. The autonomybased model is a clear rejection of th e con ve nant-ba sed mod el espoused by Paul Ramsey,
and the autonomy model in practice tends to eliminate the duties and ~ bligations to care for
and treat patients. If pure contentless patient autonomy is the model for decision-making.
the phys ician ha s no rights before the patient. The "therapeutic privilege" may be in vo ked .
but how it wou ld fare is not at all clear.
Another fundamental problem with this theory of ethics is that medical-ethical problems
are becoming more and more complicated and , des pite this fact. their theory is excess ively
simpli stic and formal. There is no material content give n to either the principles of
beneficence or of autonomy. and the authors refuse to articulate any " middle principles"
which wou ld give material content to these principles. The result is that their application is
highly co lo red by social and cultura l biases. In an age of increasin g et hical co mplexity, this
trend to mak e et hical theory purely formal and abstract should be inhibited rather than
promoted.
This book traces the hi story of these two principles and aims at determining what courses
of action are ethica lly appropriate in various so rt s of "hard cases". The foundation for the
beneficence model in the Hippocratic Oath is mentioned. but the force of the Oath is
discounted by an assertion that it was an Oath adopted by a small religious sect a nd that the
Oath was in conflict wit h itself because doing good so metimes required doing harm. The
authors complete ly ignore the medieval and high scholastic periods of ethics and moral
theo logy where fundamental and derived moral principles were given clear and specific
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material content. The authors do not trace how the principle of autonomy was limited by
the requirements of justice through the medieval legal and ethical period.
The authors also try to determine when paternalistic actions may be justified. when
autonomy can be limited by beneficence. Paternalism is defined as the intentional
limitation of the autonomy of the patient in order to promote beneficence. They try to make
these determinations by studying a hard case where a young man wanted to die rather than
undergo painful and disfiguring burn treatments. He clearly wanted to die and control his
own fate, but this was not to be permitted. Their study of this issue was hampered, however,
because they failed to develop a theory which differentiates mandated treatments and
electable care. Their theories of paternalism, autonomy and beneficence cannot generate
these specific, concrete and practical principles and this calls into question all of their
analyses.
This book seems to have a preoccupation with rational suicide, and this concern seems to
motivate the authors' study of paternalistic action. According to their principles, it is not
clear how a paternalistic physician would be able to intervene to prohibit clear suicidal
attempts by competent terminally ill patients. The authors object that permitting this
would result only from a wooden reading of the principle of autonomy, but the principles of
beneficence and paternalism are so formal and abstract that it is not clear why this reading
would not be legitimate.
Most argue for a limited paternalism policy. but it is difficult to determine the boundaries
of this sort of policy. The authors distinguish between strong and weak paternalism and
argue that weak paternalism collapses into the pure autonomy model. Weak paternalism
holds that autonomy can be limited only if a patient is substantially non-autonomous,
while strong paternalism holds that intervention can occur only when actions affect just the
person himself. Both of these have their problems, as weak paternalism would probably
permit a frightened stroke victim to go without protection, while strong paternalism would
probably force useless and costly treatments on some patients. The authors need a theory of
extraordinary medical treatments to explain why paternalism is justified in certain
instances. They reduce the problem of paternalism to problems of autonomy and
beneficence and call for a more comprehensive theory, but are unable to come to a clear and
satisfactory resolution to their problems due to the abstractness of the fundamental
principles they invoke .
The authors attempt to resolve problems of treating patients with diminished
competency and reduced autonomy, which is a serious problem because of their strong
commitment to patient autonomy . They find it difficult to prohibit "rational suicide"
because the principles requiring beneficence against clear and strongly autonomous
decisions are very weak. Their judgments are hampered, howevq, by the lack of a theory
of ordinary, required and mandatory medical treatments which cannot be withheld or
rejected without violating justice. The authors seem uneasy with permitting rational
suicide. but they cannot argue strongly against it because they do not believe that there are
any medical treatments which must be provided and received.
It would seem that suicide becomes a morally acceptable alternative in their theory
because of the formal and abstract criteria they establish for reduced autonomy. If a patient
can demonstrate that there are no external or internal constraints and show knowledge and
understanding of a situation, then he or she could choose an action such as suicide by
benign neglect. The language used to define external constraints is so vague, however, that
it could never be clear if a person was free from them. The two writers develop conditions
that limit autonomy. but they are not as precise as the traditional passion, fear, ignorance.
Competence is ambiguously defined as the ability to perform a task. The criteria for
competence are quite vague, such as the requirement that a rational reason for a choice be
given. or the failure to give a risk ! benefit calculus. They recognize that labelinga person as
incompetent can create all sorts of paternalistic events, but they hold that errors should be
made on the beneficence side of the issue, even though it is difficult to decide what
constitutes beneficence. To their credit. the authors recognize that determining or even
defining competency is extremely difficult. Because of emotional factors or the inability of
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a pati ent to accept the reality of a co nditi o n, a co mpete nt jud gment may be difficult.
Beauchamp and McCullough recogn ize th at rationality or ab ilit y to understand a situation
does not mea n that a pati en t can make a competent d ec ision.
Th e authors c hallenge the notion that the physician must a lways act in the best int eres ts
of the patient and they hold that third party interests ma y be pro mot ed at t he expe nse of th e
pati ent in so me cases. They would allow psychological a nd e moti o nal co nseque nces of
treatment to justify withholding beneficial trea tme nt s from infan ts, for in sta nce. But th e
reaso ns they give for upholding third-party int e rests are quite vague, abstract. form a l and
difficult to apply in concrete circumstances. They ho ld tha t th e pa ti e nt' s int eres ts only
impose a primajacie dut y that can be overridden when so d o in g brings about a g rea te r
good.
Determining when one can promote third part y int erests is done by weighing va riou s
harms and benefit s, which is esse ntiall y a co nseq uen tialist ana lys is. The fund a me ntal
probl em with this met hod o logy is that one never knows what harm s and benefit s are to be
includ ed and one ne ve r knows w he n to stop sea rc hin g for vlllues to be weighed. Wh e n they
urge that patient interests eith er be upheld or overridden, the authors invoke bene fice nce,
but they neve r sho w why there is a clear dut y t o act bene fi ce ntly as benefice nce cou ld
plau sibly compel action in another direction. They in voke the " best interests" stand a rd
either to warrant or prohibit paternali st ic action, but th ey ne ve r give pers uasive reasons
why this purely formal standard requires th eir reco mmended action.
Thi s book was quite dissatisfying because it relies so lely on abstract and formal
principl es. The authors almost seem fearful of esta bli s hing co ncrete, bindin g moral norm s
for medical practice, and one sus pects that th ey want medical-ethical norm s to be purel y
formal so that th ese norms ca n be used to permit or prohibit whatever th ey desire. There is
no discu ss ion of ba sic human goods or th e virtu es, which is ve ry pec uliar fo r a work in
medical ethics. They seem to assume that justice will be achieved by merely acting
beneficentl y or by protecting autonomy, however they a re defin ed.
The formalit y and abstractness of contemporary ethics should be a matter of concern, as
we now see a campaign to legali ze euthanasia brea king upon our co untry. Th ere is virtually
no mention of the dut y to trea t patie nts, and only occasionally is there any mention mad e ofa
"t herapeutic privilege". They fail to consider th e nature of medical treatme nt s and th e
conditions of patients to show how those impinge upon the moral charact er of judgme nts.
Thi s book seems to be an endorsement of the pure and contentless patient autonomy model
which all but obliterates ethical duties and obligations of hea lth care providers. If it is true
that thi s mod el is gaining d o minance in our country, then it mi g ht be necessary to take
measures to protect the duti es and obligations of physicia ns to proVi de care and trea tment
for medically vulnerable perso ns.
-Rev, Robert Barry, ,O ,P" Ph,D ,
National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow
Washington , D ,C.

I deal, Fact, and Medicine
by Charles J. Dougherty
Ne>!' York: Universill' of America Press. 1985. 202 pp.
"It might be said by some tha t thi s whole work is far too relativistic, that it accepts too
easily the claim that there are other significant moral alternatives, and that it therefore
provides no absolute foundation for the choice of th ese id ea ls and the associated ethical
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